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CURRENCY BOARD ARRANGEMENTS:  
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ADOPTION IN INDONESIA 
 
By Suyanto 
(A Lecturer in Surabaya University) 
Abstrak 
 
Tulisan ini mendiskusikan argumen-argumen pro-kontra  
perancangan “currency board“ di Indonesia. Pada waktu krisis 
ekonomi melanda Indonesia, pemerintah pernah mempertimbangkan 
kemungkinan pengadopsian “currency board“ guna mengatasi krisis 
dan menstabilkan perekonomian. Berdasarkan perdebatan panjang 
mengenai keuntungan dan kerugian penerapan “currency board“ di 
Indonesia, dapat disimpulkan bahwasanya “necessary condition“ bagi 
Indonesia untuk mengadopsi “currency board“ selama krisis tidak 
terpenuhi. Indonesia tidak mempunyai cukup cadangan valuta asing 
untuk menyokong basis moneter dan sistem perbankan belum siap 
menerima kondisi “no the lender of last resort.” Keputusan untuk 
tidak menerapkan “currency board” selama krisis ekonomi merupakan 
keputusan yang rasional. 
Kata Kunci: Currency Board 
 
A. Introduction 
In recent years, Currency Board 
Arrangements (CBAs) have gained 
increasing popularity. There has been a 
growing literature on the advantages and 
disadvantages of such arrangements, 
and on the principal considerations as to 
whether a country should adopt a CBA 
(see for example Hanke and Schuler, 
1994; Walters, 1992; Osband and 
Villanueva, 1993; Schwartz, 1993; 
Bennett, 1994; Williamson, 1995; 
Zagazaga, 1995; Balino et. al., 1997; and 
Enoch and Gulde, 1997).1 This increasing 
popularity was related to the recent 
belief that CBAs were not only suitable 
                                                          
1 Although the theoretical literature on CBAs has 
extended rapidly, the empirical examination about 
these arrangements are difficult to find. There are 
still a few empirical studies examining the 
macroeconomic performance of countries adopting 
CBAs due to the unavailability of systematic data. 
McCarthy and Zanalda (1996) compare the 
inflation and growth performances of Caribbean 
countries. Kwan and Lui (1996) compare the 
performance of Hongkong under its CBA (October 
1983 onwards) to its previous regime (1973-1983). 
Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (1998) compare the 
macroeconomic performance of countries with 
currency boards to those with other forms of 
pagged exchange rate regimes. 
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for small open economies but also for 
mid-size and even larger countries (see 
Hanke, Jonung and Schuler, 1993, and 
Balino et. al., 1997).2  
During the 1990s, five countries 
established CBAs. They are Argentina3 (in 
1991), Estonia (in 1992), Lithuania (in 
1994), Bulgaria (in 1997), and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (in 1997). Some other 
countries considered adopting such 
arrangement. El Salvador expressed 
interested in establishing one as a way to 
enhance credibility and transparency. For 
the same reason, Mexico, Peru, Brazil, 
and Russia have also considered 
establishing the arrangement during 
economic crisis. 
In the Southeast Asian region, 
Indonesia was one country that 
considered seriously adopting CBA during 
the Asian financial crisis. There was a 
huge debate about the possibility of 
Indonesia adopting a CBA. On the one 
hand, proponents of CBAs, such as 
Hanke and Schuler, recommended CBAs 
as a cure for the exchange rate instability 
in Indonesia. They argued that the 
exchange rate of rupiah to US dollar 
would achieve stability through the 
adoption of CBAs (Schuler, 1998). They 
supported their argument by pointing out 
the rise of the rupiah by 30 percent when 
                                                          
2 It is worth emphasizing that it is economic, not 
geographic or population size factors which matter 
in this respect. 
3 Argentina did adopt a CBA on 1 April 1991, but 
then she abandoned the system on 6 January 2002. 
the Indonesian government announced 
that a currency board might soon be 
introduced. On the other hand, the IMF 
disagreed with the adoption of a CBA in 
Indonesia during the crisis. The 
managing director of the IMF, Michel 
Camdessus, argued that the time has not 
yet come to Indonesia to adopt a CBA. 
Some necessary conditions should be 
satisfied before Indonesia adopts this 
arrangement. Among those is the need 
for Indonesia to obtain substantial dollar 
reserves and strengthen the country’s 
banking system. Without the capability to 
sustain a fixed exchange rate, adopting a 
CBA would not result in exchange rate 
stability. 
The interest of the Indonesian 
President at that time, Suharto, to adopt 
a CBA for Indonesia was based on his 
perception that the economic crisis was 
nothing more than a financial crisis or, to 
be more specific, an exchange rate 
problem. By stabilizing the exchange 
rate, he thought the economic crisis 
might soon end. This was the main 
reason why he then invited Hanke to 
come to Indonesia and asked Hanke as 
an advisor for the planning of a CBA in 
Indonesia. 
The debate along the possibility of 
adoption of a CBA in Indonesia during 
the economic crisis is interesting to 
examine. This paper attempts to discuss 
the arguments for and against the 
possible adoption of a CBA for Indonesia. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as 
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follows. Section 2 presents the 
theoretical background for CBAs in order 
to give a clear description about what 
CBAs are, what is the basic 
characteristics of currency boards, and 
what is the difference between currency 
boards and central banks. Section 3 
discusses the practical side of CBAs in 
order to show their performance in 
countries that established CBAs. This 
section is divided into three parts: a brief 
history of CBAs, experiences in two 
countries, and some related-studies 
about CBAs. Based on the theoretical 
background, the practical evidence, and 
the domestic institutions in Indonesia, 
section 4 explains the specific case of a 
CBA for Indonesia, such as the 
motivation of Indonesia’s government to 
consider adopting a CBA and arguments 
for and against a CBA in Indonesia. 
Concluding remarks are given in section 
5. 
 
B. Theoretical Background of CBAs 
Before discussing the specific case of 
Indonesia, one needs to know the 
theoretical framework of CBAs in order to 
obtain a clear picture. This section 
presents a definition, basic 
characteristics, a comparison between 
characteristics of a typical currency board 
and a typical central banks, and a money 
supply creation in CBAs, as a theoretical 
background for more specific analysis 
about a CBA for Indonesia. 
 
1. Definition 
A currency board arrangement can be 
categorized as a fixed exchange rate 
regime (Frankel, 1999). Some authors, 
such as Balino, et. al. (1997), Enoch and 
Gulde (1997), and Ghosh, Gulde and 
Wolf (1998), considered it as a special 
case of a rule-based monetary system. It 
is a system based on rules rather than 
discretion that serves to establish 
credibility and transparency, and avoids 
loss from monetary decisions. 
In its orthodox form4, a CBA can be 
defined as a monetary regime based on 
an explicit legislative commitment to 
exchange of domestic currency for a 
specified foreign currency at a fixed 
exchange rate, with the currency board 
as an monetary authority to ensure the 
fulfillment of its legal obligations (Balino 
et. al., 1997). The domestic currencies 
are issued only if fully backed by the 
foreign anchor currency. In this 
structure, the traditional central bank 
that acts as a monetary regulator and 
the lender of last resort is eliminated and 
replaced by a currency board that 
maintains the exchange rate at a truly 
fixed rate. 
                                                          
4 The orthodox currency board has a different 
characteristic with currency board-like systems. 
Some authors, such as Balino et. al. (1998), Enoch, 
Gulde and Wolf (1997), Roubini (1998) and 
Williamson (1995),  failed to distinguish these two 
forms. For a useful explanation about the 
differences between the orthodox currency board 
and currency board-like systems, see Hanke and 
Schuler (2000). 
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From today’s perspective when fiat 
money is universally used, the 
restrictions on currency issuance and the 
reserve-backing rule of orthodox CBAs 
appear quite stringent. In practice, 
almost every country that has established 
a CBA has introduced modifications to 
capture local factors.5 In Djibouti and 
Hongkong, the CBA maintained at least 
100 percent backing of currency in 
circulation with foreign assets and gold. 
In Argentina, Estonia and Lithuania, the 
CBA also backs the deposits held by 
commercial banks at their central banks, 
as the latter continue to provide 
payments and settlement services. In 
Argentina, the law required that one-
third of the reserve backing was in US 
dollars and two-thirds was in foreign 
assets. In practice, the actual foreign 
assets of base money in Argentina were 
around 95 percent. The CBA of Lithuania 
backs 100 percent of currency in 
circulation and all other central bank 
liquid liabilities. The CBA of Brunei 
Darussalam and the Eastern Caribbean 
Central Bank (ECCB)6 are required to 
back only 60 to 70 percent of reserve 
money with foreign assets. 
                                                          
5 These modified CBAs are categorized as 
currency board-like systems by Hanke and Schuler 
(1994). 
6 Hanke and Schuler (1994) did not classify the 
ECCB as a CBA or a currency board-like system. 
They argued that the ECCB is a monetary system 
that maintains a certain amount of reserves which 
has discretion to lend to commercial banks and 
member governments. 
The orthodox CBAs do not require 
central banks for their operation. 
However, the currency board-like 
systems established institutional 
frameworks allowing the existence of a 
central bank. Argentina, Estonia and 
Lithuania institutionally established 
central banks and retained some or all 
functions of central banks.  For example, 
the Bank of Estonia (BOE) regularly 
informed the public if it held foreign 
exchange reserves as backing of 
currency. The BOE holds the excess 
foreign reserves, takes monetary 
operations, and exercises bank 
supervision. The CBAs of Argentina and 
Lithuania also retain many traditional 
central bank functions, including 
settlement of payments system 
transactions. 
2. Basic Features of CBAs 
CBAs differ from the conventional 
pegs (adjustable peg, crawling peg, and 
basket peg) in the nature of the 
restriction they set on changing the level 
of the exchange rate and the sources of 
reserve money creation (Balino et. al., 
1998). The main characteristics of CBAs 
are as follow (Hanke and Schuler, 1994; 
Frankel, 1999): 
a. Anchor currency 
The anchor currency is a currency 
chosen for its expected stability and 
international acceptability. The 
anchor currencies usually used by 
CBAs were the British pound and the 
US dollar. Some recent currency 
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board-like systems used the Euro as 
the anchor currency. A few CBAs 
have used gold as the anchor 
currency. 
b. Convertibility 
CBAs maintain full-unlimited 
convertibility between its notes and 
coins and the anchor currency at a 
fixed rate of exchange. Although an 
orthodox currency board typically 
does not convert local deposits 
denominated in its currency into the 
anchor currency, banks will offer to 
do so for a small fee. A currency 
board has no responsibility for 
ensuring that bank deposits (demand 
deposits) are convertible into 
currency board notes. It is banks that 
have responsibility to ensure the 
convertibility of bank deposits. The 
currency board is concerned only 
with the notes and coins that it 
issues. The full-unlimited 
convertibility into the anchor 
currency means that in an orthodox 
CBA, no restrictions exist in current-
account transactions (buying and 
selling goods and services) or capital-
account transactions (buying and 
selling financial assets, such as 
foreign bonds). 
c. Law 
The exchange rate is fixed not just 
by policy, but also by law. The 
currency board can not alter the 
exchange rate, except in the 
emergency case. Before altering the 
exchange rate, the currency board 
has to change the law that regulates 
the exchange rate. 
d. Reserves 
In order to ensure all holders that its 
notes and coins can be converted 
into the reserve currency, an 
orthodox CBA maintains an adequate 
amount of reserves. Usually, the 
reserves are equal to 105 or 110 
percent of its monetary liabilities in 
order to have margin protection if 
the bonds it holds lose value. 
e. Profits 
Unlike bonds or most bank deposits, 
notes and coins do not pay interest. 
They are like an interest free loan 
from the people who hold them to 
the issuers. The issuer’s profit equals 
the interest it earns on its reserve 
assets minus the expense of 
maintaining its liabilities. Typically, 
the expense is not more than one 
percent of the total assets per year. 
f. Self-correcting balance of payments 
mechanism 
There is no balance of payment 
problems in countries that 
established CBAs. A balance of 
payments deficit automatically 
contracts the money supply, resulting 
in a contraction of spending. The 
same mechanism also happens 
within a balance of payment surplus. 
A balance of payments surplus 
automatically expands the money 
supply, resulting in an expansion of 
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spending. A currency board does not 
have to intervence in the money 
market in order to correct the 
disequilibrium. The detailed 
explanation about this mechanism is 
presented in sub section 4 when we 
discuss money supply creation in 
CBAs. 
g. Monetary policy 
By design, an orthodox currency 
board has no discretionary power. Its 
operations are completely passive 
and automatic. Its main function is to 
exchange notes and coins for the 
anchor currency at a fixed rate. An 
orthodox currency board does not 
lend to the domestic government, to 
domestic companies, or to domestic 
banks. In CBAs, the government 
finances its spending from only taxes 
and/or debts. The government can 
not finance its budget by printing 
money because all new coins and 
notes should be backed by reserve 
assets. 
h. Interest rate and inflation 
In orthodox CBAs, the currency 
board does not try to influence 
interest rates. The fixed exchange 
rate with an anchor currency 
encourages arbitrage that tends to 
keep domestic inflation and interest 
rates equal to international inflation 
and interest rates. However, 
exceptions occur in countries that 
replace highly inflationary central 
banks with currency boards. In such 
cases, prices for many goods are 
initially low in terms of the anchor 
currency, because the domestic 
currency has very low value. The 
inflation, even though lower than 
before a currency board established, 
is higher than in the anchor-currency 
country. 
i. Relation to banks 
Since a currency board has no share 
in the profits of banks, it has no 
responsibility as a lender of last 
resort to protect them from losses. 
Bank failures have been rare in 
orthodox CBAs. However, in recent 
currency board-like arrangements, 
especially those that replace central 
banks with currency boards during 
banking problems, bank failure 
usually happened. 
The above characteristics are usually 
found in an orthodox currency board. In 
currency board-like arrangements, the 
characteristic has been modified, 
depending on the institutional prevalence 
when the CBAs were established.7 Some 
countries that established currency 
board-like arrangements hold reserves 
less than 100 percent of its liabilities and 
some others maintains central banks in 
their monetary systems. 
 
 
                                                          
7 For discussion about institutional framework of 
CBAs, see in particular Cammilleri Gilson (2002). 
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3. A Typical Currency Board Versus 
a Typical Central Bank 
In Indonesia, a currency board is 
foreign. A central bank is the familiar 
institution. This is because the current 
monetary system in Indonesia comprises 
a central bank (Bank Indonesia), 
commercial banks, and other financial 
institutions. The comparison between 
typical currency boards and typical 
central banks may be helpful to explain a 
currency board to Indonesian. Without a 
proper concept about a currency board, 
establishing a currency board in 
Indonesia would only create a 
psychological panic. 
Table 1 itemizes the features that 
distinguish typical currency boards and 
central banks. The items in Table 1 are 
generally self-explanatory. This paper will 
not explain all these items in great 
detail.8 Only several items merit further 
                                                          
8 For detailed explanation about these items see 
Hanke and Schuler (1994, 2000) or Schuler 
(1998).  
Table 1. A Typical Currency Board And A Typical Central Bank 
 
Typical currency board Typical central bank 
Usually supplies notes and coins only Supplies notes, coins, and deposits 
Fixed exchange rate with reserve 
currency 
Pegged or float exchange rate 
No conflict between exchange rate 
policies and monetary policies 
Frequent conflicts between exchange rate 
policies and monetary policies 
No balance of payments crises Frequent balance of payment crises 
Foreign reserve of 100 percent Variable foreign reserve 
Can not become insolvent Can become insolvent 
Does not hold domestic assets Does hold domestic assets 
Full convertibility Limited convertibility 
Rule-bound monetary policy Discretionary monetary policy 
Not a lender of last resort Lender of last resort 
Does not regulate commercial banks Often regulate commercial banks 
Transparent Opaque 
Immune from corruption scandals Prone to corruption scandals 
Protected from political pressure Politicized 
High credible Low credible 
Earn seigniorage only from interest  Earn seigniorage from interest and inflation 
Cannot create inflation Can create inflation 
Cannot finance spending by domestic 
government 
Can finance spending by domestic government 
Requires no preconditions for monetary 
reform 
Requires precondition for monetary reform 
Rapid monetary reform Slow monetary reform 
Small staff Large staff 
Source: Hanke and Schuler (1994), Hanke (2002) 
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comment. The comment are summary in 
three basic features as follows: 
a. Balance sheets 
A balance sheet reveals a monetary 
authority’s liabilities (high-powered 
base money or monetary base). It is 
also shows the make-up of those 
liabilities, or the split between net 
domestic assets (the domestic 
component of monetary base) and 
net foreign assets (the foreign 
component of monetary base). A 
currency board’s balance sheet 
contains only net foreign reserves 
because it can not sell and buy 
domestic assets. As a result, a 
currency board can not engage in 
discretionary monetary policy, and its 
monetary liabilities (monetary base) 
are exclusively made up of foreign 
components (Hanke, 2002). Changes 
in monetary base are exclusively 
driven by changes in the net foreign 
reserves. 
 In contrast, a central bank’s 
balance sheet contains both net 
domestic assets and net foreign 
assets. This means that a central 
bank can engage in discretionary 
monetary policy by buying and 
selling domestic assets. As a result, a 
central bank can change the 
monetary base at will, or with the 
approval from the government. 
Changes monetary base, both 
domestic and foreign components, 
changes the money supply, and then 
in turn will change the exchange 
rate. Figure 1 shows the comparison 
of a typical currency board balance 
sheet and a typical central bank 
balance sheet. 
 Since the function is only to store 
foreign assets that backs its notes 
and coins in circulation without ability 
to conduct monetary policy, currency 
boards operate their activities 
transparently. They post their current 
balance sheets on web sites (Hanke, 
2002). This is not the case for central 
banks. Of the 174 central banks, only 
124 have web sites, and only 14 
display current balance sheets 
(Hanke, 2001). 
b. Exchange rate regimes 
With currency board rules, a 
monetary authority sets the 
exchange rate fixed at a specific 
anchor currency, usually a hard 
currency. The quantity of monetary 
base in CBAs is solely determined by 
the demand for it in the market. As a 
result, there can be no conflicts 
between exchange rate policy and 
monetary policy in the arrangements. 
There is also no balance of payments 
problem in CBAs because market 
forces automatically act to rebalance 
financial flows. 
 As a contrast, central banks in 
developing countries simultaneously 
manage exchange rate policies and 
monetary policies. They usually 
operate with pegged exchange rates 
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(adjustable peg, crawling peg, basket 
peg, target zone, or managed float). 
With pegged exchange rate regimes, 
conflicts between exchange rate 
policies and monetary policies 
frequently happen. For example, 
when capital inflows become 
excessive under a pegged exchange 
rate regime, the net foreign assets 
increase. A monetary authority often 
attempts to sterilize the effect by 
reducing the net domestic assets in 
order to maintain the same amount 
of monetary base. The same 
mechanism also happens when there 
is an excessive capital outflow. A 
monetary authority often attempts to 
offset the decrease in net foreign 
assets with an increasing in net 
domestic assets in order to maintain 
the same amount of monetary base. 
Balance of payments crises erupt as 
a monetary authority increasingly 
offsets the reduction in net foreign 
assets. 
c. The issuance of credit by a monetary 
authority 
A typical currency board is not a 
lender of last resort. It does not lend 
to commercial banks or other firms 
to help them avoid bankruptcy. A 
typical central bank, in contrast, is a 
lender of last resort. In Indonesia, 
this function of the central bank has 
created a problem in banking 
systems. Theoretically, central banks 
lend to commercial banks only in 
emergencies (Goodhart, 1988). 
Unfortunately, Bank Indonesia is not 
so self-disciplined. It lends to 
commercial banks in situations that 
are not emergencies. As a result, 
commercial banks always depend on 
Bank Indonesia as a lender. Bank 
i. Currency Board balance sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Foreign reserves Notes and coins in circulation 
 Deposit of commercial banks (optional) 
 Net worth 
  
ii. Central Bank balance sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Foreign reserves Notes and coins in circulation 
Domestic assets (including government 
debt) 
Deposit of commercial banks 
 Net worth 
Figure 1. Comparison of Currency Board and Central Bank Balance Sheets 
(Camilleri Gilson, 2002) 
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Indonesia is not a lender of last 
resort anymore but in fact it has 
become the lender of first resort. 
Every time the commercial banks 
need cash, they always come to 
Bank Indonesia. Some commercial 
banks even used this opportunity to 
speculate with risky projects. They 
lend the money from customers to 
high-risk projects with high returns. 
If the project fails, they depend on 
Bank Indonesia to help them. 
 Currency boards can not lend 
money to the domestic government 
in order to finance budget deficits or 
to domestic state enterprises to 
finance their operations because the 
currency boards are not allowed to 
lend money to them. In contrast, 
central banks finance spending by 
the domestic government. It had 
happened in Indonesia before the 
1980s. Bank Indonesia printed 
money to finance the government 
budgets. In the early 1980s, a law 
that prevented Bank Indonesia 
financing government budget deficits 
was implemented. 
4. The Money Supply Creation in 
CBAs 
Since a currency board’s balance 
sheet only contain foreign asset 
component of the monetary base without 
ability to conduct monetary policy 
whereas a central bank’s balance sheet 
contains both foreign and domestic 
components of the monetary policy, the 
mechanism to create money supply 
would be different. This part will show 
the supply of money in a currency board 
system and a central bank system in 
order to compare the mechanism of the 
supply of money in these two systems. 
a. The supply of money in a currency 
board system 
In a currency board monetary system, 
a currency board has no active role on 
determining the monetary base. It can 
not increase or decrease the monetary 
base at its own discretion. It also can not 
influence the relationship between the 
monetary base and the money supply by 
changing reserve requirement ratio or 
regulating commercial banks. The supply 
of money in currency board system is 
determined entirely by market forces. 
Since the only asset in a currency 
board is foreign reserves, the only source 
that can change the monetary base is the 
changing in net foreign reserve. 
Changing in net foreign assets is resulted 
from the imbalance in overall balance of 
payment. By making certain simplifying 
assumption, a surplus in overall balance 
of payment increases the monetary base, 
and hence the supply of money will also 
increase. A deficit in overall balance of 
payment decreases the monetary base, 
and hence the supply of money will also 
decrease. Figure 2 illustrates the surplus 
in overall balance of payment that affects 
the increasing in money supply. Let us 
start with the initial situation where the 
overall balance of payment is zero. 
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Suppose that foreign demand for 
domestic goods increase (exports 
increase). It causes a surplus in the 
overall balance of payment. Through the 
mechanism depicted in Figure 2, the 
overall balance of payment returns to 
zero with a new equilibrium and the 
relevant markets clear. 
In the case of overall balance of 
payment deficit, the deficit will then 
decrease the money supply through the 
sequencing depicted in Figure 3. When 
the overall balance of payment deficit, 
bank reserve decrease. Banks decrease 
loans and increase interest rates. As a 
result, people have less money to spend 
and it lowering prices of domestic goods. 
The overall balance of payment returns 
to zero with a new equilibrium in relevant 
markets. 
b. The Supply Of Money in A Central 
Banking System 
A central bank has an ability to alter 
the money supply. Since the assets in a 
 
1. Overall balance of payment is zero – initial equilibrium 
2. Foreign demand for goods of currency board system increase 
3. Surplus in the overall balance of payment 
4. Reserve of commercial bank increase 
5. Commercial banks increase loans and decrease interest rates 
6. People spend some of the new loans, raising prices of domestic goods 
7. Foreign demand for goods of currency board system decreases 
8. Balance of payment return to zero – new equilibrium 
 
Figure 2. Money Supply Increase in A Currency Board System 
(Hanke and Schuler, 1994; Schuler, 1998) 
1. Overall balance of payment is zero – equilibrium 
2. Foreign demand for goods of currency board system decreases 
3. Deficit in the overall balance of payment 
4. Reserve of commercial banks decrease 
5. Commercial banks decrease loans and increase interest rates 
6. People have less money to spend, lowering prices of domestic goods 
7. Foreign demand for goods of currency board system increases 
8. Balance of payment returns to zero – new equilibrium 
 
Figure 3. Money Supply Decrease in A Currency Board System 
(Hanke and Schuler, 1994; Schuler, 1998) 
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central bank’s balance sheet contain both 
the domestic component and the foreign 
component of the monetary base, a 
central bank can increase or decrease 
money supply through the change in 
domestic component of the monetary 
base, for example through buying or 
selling government bonds. Therefore, the 
money supply in a central bank system 
depends on changing in both net foreign 
assets and net domestic assets. Let us 
assume that the central banking system 
adopts free float exchange rate regimes. 
Hence, the central bank has a full 
discretionary control on the monetary 
base. 
Suppose in this case, a changing in 
money supply is because of the changing 
in the domestic component of monetary 
base. Figure 4 presents the sequences of 
increasing in money supply in a central 
bank system with a floating exchange 
rate, and figure 5 depicts the sequences 
of decreasing in money supply in a 
central bank system with a floating 
exchange rate. 
 
 
1. Equilibrium – for example, 10,000 rupiah = US$1 
2. Unexpected decision by central bank to increase monetary base (for example, 
by lending to Government) 
3. Reserves of commercial banks increase 
4. Loans by commercial banks increase 
5. People spend some of the new loans, raising prices of domestic goods 
6. They also spend more on buying foreign currency, making the exchange rate 
depreciate, for example to 10,500 rupiah = US$1 (new equilibrium) 
 
Figure 4. Money supply increase in a central bank with a floating exchange rate 
(Hanke and Schuler, 1994; Schuler, 1998) 
 
1. Equilibrium – for example, 10,000 rupiah = US$1 
2. Unexpected decision by central bank to decrease monetary base (for example, 
by selling assets) 
3. Reserves of commercial banks decrease 
4. Loans by commercial banks decrease 
5. People have less money to spend, lowering prices of domestic goods 
6. They also spend less on foreign currency, making the exchange rate 
appreciate to, for example, 9,500 rupiah = US$1 (new equilibrium) 
 
Figure 5. Money Supply Decrease in A Central Bank With A Floating Exchange Rate 
(Hanke and Schuler, 1994; Schuler, 1998) 
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C. Practical evidence of CBAs 
We have discussed the theoretical 
side of CBAs in previous sections. It is 
time to discuss the practical side of these 
arrangements in countries that 
established CBAs. We start with a brief 
history about CBAs from the colonial era 
to the recent CBAs. Then in the second 
part, we discuss the experiences of CBAs 
in two countries, Hong Kong and 
Argentina. We consider Hong Kong’s CBA 
as a “success” story and Argentina’s CBA 
as a “failure” story. The third part 
presents studies done by some experts 
who compared the performances of 
countries that established CBAs with 
countries adopting other pegged 
exchange rate arrangements or even 
with countries adopting floating 
exchange rate arrangements. 
1. A brief history of CBAs 
This sub-section explains a brief 
history of CBAs9 and the existing CBAs 
and currency board-like arrangements. 
Until recently, CBAs have existed in more 
than seventy countries.10 The first CBA 
was established in 1849 in the British 
Indian Ocean colony of Mauritius, based 
on the idea of the Currency School. The 
CBA achieve its mature orthodox form 
with the West African Currency Board, 
established in 1912 for the British 
                                                          
9 For detail discussion about the history of 
currency boards, see King (1957), Schuler (1992) 
and Schwartz (1993). 
colonies of Nigeria, the Gold Coast 
(Ghana), Sierra Leone, and the Gambia. 
The West African Currency Board was a 
model for many later CBAs. In the 1930s, 
CBAs were widespread in 70 British 
colonies in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, 
and the Pacific Islands.11 CBAs have also 
existed in a number of independent 
countries and city-states, such as Danzig 
and Singapore. One of the most 
interesting CBAs was installed in North 
Russia on 11 November 1918, during the 
civil war. Its architect was John Maynard 
Keynes, who was a British Treasury 
official responsible for war finance at the 
time (Hanke, Jonung, and Schuler, 
1993). The used of CBAs peaked in the 
1940s and declined thereafter. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, CBAs 
disappeared because of the intellectual 
fashion in favor of central banks 
(Schuler, 2002). Another reason that 
CBAs disappeared was that most CBAs 
existed in British colonies, and when the 
colonies achieved independence they 
indiscriminately replaced many existing 
institutions (Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf, 
1998; Frankel, 1999). Many newly 
independent African countries replaced 
                                                                          
10 For a list of countries which established CBAs, 
see Hanke, Jonung, and Schuller, 1993, Appendix 
C. 
11 The purpose was to provide the colonies with a 
stable currency without the associated difficulty of 
issuing sterling notes and coins that were costly to 
replace if lost or destroyed. The colonies also 
benefited from this approach in that they could 
earn interest on the foreign currency assets being 
held in reserve. 
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their currency board with a central bank 
in the 1960s, and most other countries 
followed suit in the 1970s. 
The recent CBAs mostly are currency 
board-like arrangements. They are 
different from the orthodox CBAs in their 
characteristics and functions. Most 
currency board-like arrangements 
modified the orthodox form and adjusted 
it into the domestic institutions (Schuler, 
1992; Balino et. al., 1998; Cammileri 
Gilson, 2002). The more or less orthodox 
CBAs exist in Bermuda, the Cayman 
Islands, the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, 
and the Faroe Islands (Table 2 presents 
countries that established CBAs). All 
these countries are very small in term of 
economic size and lack global influences. 
Therefore, the studies about the 
experiences of CBAs in these economies 
are often neglected. With the existence 
of a CBA in Hong Kong and the existence 
Table 2. Currency boards and currency board-like systems as of June 2002 
 
Country Population GDP (US$) Began Exchange rate Remarks 
Bermuda 
(UK) 
63,000 $2 billion 1915 Bermuda $1 = US$1 Loose capital 
controls 
Bosnia 3.8 million $6.2 
billion 
1997 1.95583 convertible 
marks = 1 euro 
Currency 
board-like 
Brunei 336,000 $5.6 
billion 
1952 Brunei $1 = Singapore 
$1 
Currency 
board-like 
Bulgaria 7.8 million $35 
billion 
1997 1.95583 leva = 1 euro Currency 
board-like 
Cayman 
Islands 
(UK) 
35,000 $930 
million 
1972 Cayman $1 = US$1.20  
Djibouti 450,000 $550 
million 
1949 177.72 Djibouti francs 
= US$1 
Currency 
board-like 
Estonia 1.4 million $7.9 
billion 
1992 8 kroons = 0.51129 
euro 
Currency 
board-like 
Falkland 
Islands 
(UK) 
2,800 Unavailab
le 
1899 Falklands £1 = UK £1  
Faroe 
Islands 
(Denmark) 
45,000 $700 
million 
1940 1 Faroese krone = 1 
Danish Krone 
 
Gibraltar 
(UK) 
29,000 $500 
million 
1927 Gibraltar £1 = UK £1  
Hong 
Kong 
7.1 million $158 
billion 
1983 Hong Kong $7.80 = 
US$1 
More orthodox 
since 1998 
Lithuania 3.6 million $17 
billion 
1994 3.4528 litai = 1 euro Currency 
board-like 
Source: Schuler, 2002. 
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of currency board-like arrangement in 
Argentina, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, 
and Bosnia recently, the discussion about 
CBAs has expanded rapidly. 
2. Experiences in Two Countries 
This part presents the experiences of 
two countries that established CBAs. 
Those countries are Hong Kong and 
Argentina. Hong Kong’s currency board is 
considered as the most prominent and 
successful currency board in recent 
times. In contrast, Argentina’s currency 
board is considered as an unsuccessful 
currency board. 
a. Hong Kong 
Hong Kong’s currency board is an 
attractive example of a “success” story of 
currency boards. Proponents of currency 
boards often point out Hong Kong’s 
currency board as a benchmark for the 
adoption of CBAs in several countries (for 
example, Hanke, Jonung, and Schuler, 
1993; Hanke and Schuler, 1994; Schuler, 
1998). There are three reasons why 
Hong Kong’s currency board is attractive 
to examine. First, Hong Kong’s dominant 
monetary institution since 1935 has been 
the currency board, with episodes of 
abolition and re-adoption. Second, Hong 
Kong is a large country, in terms of 
economic size, which is open to 
international trade. The argument that 
CBAs are only for small and very open 
economies does not hold in the case of 
Hong Kong’s currency board. Third, the 
Hong Kong dollar has gone through 
several speculative attacks, some of 
which had serious consequences on the 
economy. However, the currency board 
still works consistently in this economy. 
Hong Kong’s currency board (officially 
known as the Exchange Fund) was 
introduced in 1935 when the government 
decided to abandon the silver standard. 
Table 3 shows the chronology of major 
events in Hong Kong’s currency board. 
From 1935 to 1967, with the exception of 
four years of World War II, the Hong 
Kong dollar was pegged to the British 
pound sterling at the exchange rate of 
HK$16 to British £1. The exchange rate 
was revalued from HK$16 to HK$14.55 
per British pound sterling. From 1972 to 
1974, it was pegged to the US dollar. 
The government decided to let the 
currency float on 25th November 1974. 
The financial crisis induced by the 
Sino-British negotiation over the future of 
Hong Kong caused downward pressure 
on the exchange rate, and forced the 
government to go back to the currency 
board system, with fixed exchange rate 
HK$7.80 per US$. The actual exchange 
rate in the market, however, generally 
differed from parity. This fixed exchange 
rate is maintained until today. 
Since 1988, Hong Kong’s currency 
board has undergone a series of 
institutional changes initiated by the 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA). 
This institutional change has gradually 
increase the power of the HKMA to act 
like a central bank in some respects. In 
1988, the HKMA introduced some new 
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“Accounting Arrangements” to conduct 
open market operations. In March 1990, 
the HKMA introduced “Exchange Fund 
Bills”, which have similar functions to 
short-term US Treasury bills. Then, at the 
end of 1990 the HKMA introduced a 
Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) to 
provide short-term liquidity to 
commercial banks. 
Hong Kong’s currency board 
experienced the first serious speculative 
attack in October 1997 during the Asian 
financial crisis. A huge capital outflow 
happened during that period. In order to 
Table 3. Chronology of Major Events on Hong Kong’s Currency Board 
 
Year Events 
1935 The government of Hong Kong decided to abandon the silver 
standard and established a currency board, with an official 
name the Exchange Fund 
1935 – 1966 The Hong Kong dollar was pegged to the British pound sterling 
at the rate of HK$16=UK£1 
1967 The exchange rate revalued to HK$14.55=UK£1 
1972 –1974 The Hong Kong dollar was pegged to US$ 
25th November 
1974 
The Hong Kong dollar was floated 
Around 1976 Because of financial crisis introduced by the Sino-British 
negotiation over the future of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong 
dollar dropped sharply. The government decided to re-
established a currency board system at a fixed rate HK$7.8 = 
US$1 
1988 New “accounting arrangement” was introduced, which allows 
HKMA to perform open market operations. From this stage, 
Hong Kong currency board was not orthodox. 
March 1990 The HKMA introduced “Exchange Fund Bills”, which is similar to 
short term US Treasury bills. 
End of 1990 The HKMA introduced LAF to provide short-term liquidity to 
commercial banks 
October 1997 The first serious speculative attack on Hong Kong dollar during 
the Asian financial crisis 
August 1998 The HKMA bought massive amount of Hong Kong shares on 
the stock market in order to maintain the stock market prices 
and the exchange rate 
5th November 
1998 
The HKMA decided to revert to more orthodox CBA 
Source: summarized from Nugee (1995), Kwan and Lui (1999), Lui, Cheng, and Kwan 
(2002), and Schuler (2002). 
Currency Board Arrangements: Arguments for and against … --- Suyanto 
 
 
Jurnal Ekonomi & Pendidikan, Volume 2, Nomor 1, Agustus 2004 
 
 
38
stop more capital outflow from Hong 
Kong, the HKMA increased the interest 
rate.12 As a result the interest rate 
become very sensitive to capital 
outflows. The Hong Kong inter-bank 
interest rate (HIBOR) reached a peak of 
300 percent on October 1997 when there 
was a rumor that the HKMA would 
charge penalty interest rate to 
commercial banks that used LAF 
repeatedly (Lui, Cheng, and Kwan, 
2000). 
The effort of the HKMA to counter 
speculative attacks with interest rate 
arbitrage did not work well. On the 
contrary, this action caused a credit 
crunch in the banking system (Lui, 
Cheng, and Kwan, 2000). The fact that 
the HKMA had deviated from the fixed 
rule of the currency board made its 
commitment to peg much less credible. 
Huge capital outflows continuously 
happened because speculators expected 
the HK$ would be depreciated further 
against the US$. As a result, the 
economic and political costs of 
speculative attacks during the period 
were significant. 
On 5th November 1998, the HKMA 
decided to revert to a more orthodox 
currency board with the introduction of 
structured notes. This decision effectively 
put the HKMA back onto the rule-bound 
                                                          
12 For detailed explanation about the discretionary 
measures that used by the HKMA to magnify 
interest rate volatility, see in particular Lui, Cheng, 
and Kwan (2000). 
track. Interest rate arbitrage appeared to 
be effective again. The commitment of 
the HKMA to maintain the exchange rate 
seems to have re-gained respect from 
economic agents.  
The important point we can draw 
from Hong Kong’s experiences is the 
success of a currency board requires a 
sustainable fixed exchange rate. Once 
the exchange rate is not sustainably 
fixed, there will be an incentive for 
speculators to attack the currency board. 
b. Argentina 
During the 1980s, Argentina’s 
macroeconomy was unstable. The public 
sector deficit was huge, the nation was in 
default on its foreign debt, hyperinflation 
reigned, and there was massive capital 
flight. In 1989, the Menem government 
began a series of economic reforms. One 
of the most significant was the April 1991 
Law on Convertibility, which established 
a CBA in Argentina.  The Argentinean 
currency was fixed at an exchange rate 
of 10,000 australes (later = 1 peso) per 
US dollar and to be backed 100% by 
foreign currency reserves. 
The Argentinean economic reforms 
have been aimed at liberalizing and 
privatizing the economy, reducing the 
public sector deficit, and lowering 
inflation. Together, they have brought 
very positive results. The inflation has 
declined steadily from a 39% monthly 
rate in 1989 to less than 4% for all of 
1994. The growth rate has climbed by 
6% in 1994. Meanwhile, foreign 
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investment has flowed into the country in 
ever increasing amounts. Foreign 
currency reserves have tripled since 
1991. 
The success in economic reform also 
helped Argentina avoid the effect from 
Mexico’s Tequila Crisis of 1995. 
Argentina’s GDP grew by 5.5 percent in 
1996 and 8.1 percent in 1997. However, 
the economy ran into trouble in 1999, 
after Brazil’s devaluation and before its 
own presidential elections. The elected 
president in December 1999, Fernando 
de la Rua, did not succeed in reforming 
the supply side of the economy. On the 
contrary, he brought the economy into 
fiscal deficit problems and a crisis of 
confidence.  
In June 2001, in order to overcome 
the crisis effect from Brazil’s devaluation, 
the economic ministry, under Domingo 
Cavallo, introduced a dual-currency 
regime. Cavallo was famous because of 
his success in reducing the country’s 
hyperinflation. However this time, he 
made mistakes that worsened 
Argentina’s economy. 
Under a dual-currency regime, all 
Argentina’s exports (including oil) take 
place using a devalued peso, all imports 
with a revalued peso, and all other 
transactions take place at a peso-dollar 
rate of one-to-one. This regime was 
considered by the markets as showing an 
inability of the Argentinean government 
to sustain a fixed rate. Markets expected 
the peso to depreciate. As a result, a 
huge amount of capital flowed out from 
Argentinean economy. 
The important point that can be 
drawn from Argentina’s experience is a 
changing of monetary regimes from a 
hard regime to a soft regime during a 
financial crisis would cause the exchange 
rate decrease further. Hence, the 
exchange rate problem would become 
worse. Very high costs would be paid 
because of inconsistency in maintaining 
one exchange rate regime. 
3. Studies About The Economic 
Performance of CBAs 
Some studies have been done in 
order to measure the performance of 
countries with CBAs. Table 4 shows the 
summary of those studies. The studies in 
Table 4 are generally self-explanatory. 
However, two points can be drawn from 
them. First, these studies showed that 
the economic performance in countries 
under CBAs is more stable compared to 
countries with other pegged exchange 
rate regimes or even to countries with 
floating exchange rate regimes. The 
inflation is lower, the growth rate is 
higher, the interest rate is lower, and the 
fiscal deficit is lower. Second, the relation 
between currency board operations and 
credibility is still unclear. Theoretical 
argument about the high credibility of 
currency boards seems not happen in 
reality. 
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D. Indonesia and A CBA 
This section explains the reason why 
Indonesia considered adopting a 
currency board and why it then decided 
not to establish one. This section is 
divided into two parts. First is the 
motivation of Indonesia to consider a 
currency board. The second part is 
arguments for and against a currency 
board in Indonesia. 
1. The Motivation For Indonesia to 
Consider Adopting A CBA 
The Indonesian government 
considered adopting a CBA during 
Table 4. Studies About The Economic Performance of CBAs 
 
Author Countries Objective of study Finding 
McCarthy and 
Zanalda (1996) 
Caribbean countries Compare the inflation and 
growth performances of 
Caribbean countries under 
CBAs with other Caribbean 
countries 
The subgroup of countries 
operating under a CBA had 
lower inflation and higher 
growth than other comparable 
Caribbean economies 
Kwan and Lui 
(1996) 
Hong Kong (China) Compare the performance 
of Hong Kong under its 
CBA (october 1983 
onwards) to its previous 
float exchange rate regime 
(1973-1983) 
Based on a counter factual 
simulation, they conclude that 
inflation would have been lower 
during the floating period had 
Hong Kong operated under a 
CBA 
Ghosh, Gulde, 
and Wolf 
(1998) 
Countries under 
CBAs and countries 
under other pegged 
exchange rate 
regimes 
Compare the performance 
of countries under CBAs 
and countries under other 
pegged exchange rate 
regimes 
On average, inflation under 
CBAs was about 4 percent points 
lower than under other pegged 
exchange rate regimes. 
Countries with CBAs actually 
grew faster than the average of 
all countries with other pegged 
exchange rate regimes 
Hanke (2000) Argentina, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Bulgaria, 
and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Compare the stability of 
the five countries before 
and after the installation 
of CBAs 
All five countries were more 
stable after the adoption of 
CBAs. The annual inflation was 
lower, the growth rate was 
higher, the interest rate was 
lower, foreign reserve increased, 
and fiscal deficit decreased 
Hanke (2002) Ninety-eight 
developing 
countries 
Compare the economic 
performance of  currency 
boards and central banks 
in developing countries 
Currency board systems have 
higher growth, lower inflation, 
and lower fiscal deficit compare 
to central bank systems 
Camillery Gilson 
(2002) 
Argentina (1991-
2001), Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Hong Kong, and 
Lithuania 
Evaluate the policy pre-
commitment and 
institutional design in CBAs 
The currency boards can only be 
viewed as part of a wider policy 
framework encompassing fiscal 
sustainability and flexibility in 
the real economy. However, the 
link between currency board 
operations and credibility is far 
from obvious. 
Source: Author’s survey 
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economic crisis. The main reason behind 
this consideration was to find a quick 
solution to the crisis. A currency board 
was considered to be a remedial action 
to counter speculative attack an 
exchange rates (Hanke, Jonung, and 
Schuler, 1993; Hanke and Schuler, 1994; 
Schuler, 1998). Since President Suharto 
thought that the crisis was only an 
exchange rate problem, he considered 
establishing a currency board in order to 
stabilize the exchange rate. With a stable 
exchange rate, the inflation rate might be 
lowered into single digits and the 
economy then might start to grow. This 
belief seems to ignore the fact that the 
economic crisis in Indonesia was not only 
a problem of the exchange rate. The 
crisis involved more complex economic 
problems, both in financial and real 
sectors. At the beginning of the 
recession, the only problem was indeed 
the instability of the rupiah because of 
speculative action. There was only the 
financial sector in crisis. However, 
because of the weak fundamentals of the 
Indonesian economy, the financial crisis 
then affected the real sectors. The huge 
capital flight resulted from the extreme 
loss of confidence from investors about 
Indonesian economy, causing the real 
sector to collapse.13 
During the financial crisis, the 
exchange rate was indeed falling very 
                                                          
13 For a detailed explanation about Indonesia’s 
economic crisis, see in particular World Bank 
(1998). 
quickly. On 1 July 1997, just before 
Thailand devalued the baht, the rupiah 
was 2431 per dollar. The rupiah then 
began to depreciate, first at a moderate 
rate, then in January 1998, it fell rapidly 
and reached a bottom of 17,000 per 
dollar. By the end of January 1998, the 
exchange rate was more than 12,000 per 
dollar. The proponents of fixed exchange 
regimes argues that the fall of the rupiah 
was because the central bank of 
Indonesia (Bank Indonesia) no longer 
kept the exchange rate stable in terms of 
US dollar. Under the floating exchange 
rate, nothing would prevent the rupiah 
from falling to 15,000 or 20,000 per 
dollar as the loss of confidence in the 
rupiah became outright panic. The 
opponents of fixed exchange rate 
regimes, however, argued that pegging 
the rupiah at a certain value per dollar at 
that time was also not a good solution. 
Bank Indonesia ran out of foreign 
reserves in order to maintain a fixed rate. 
To obtain more foreign reserves, Bank 
Indonesia borrowed from the IMF and 
other countries that give bilateral loans. 
As a result, foreign debt increased 
sharply. Solving the exchange rate 
problem using a pegged exchange rate 
resulted in a new problem, government 
foreign debt. 
Pegging the rupiah at a certain value 
to the US dollar while there was a huge 
capital outflow was impossible. Indonesia 
was not an exception to the impossible 
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trinity (Leung, 1996).14 By allowing 
capital to flow freely, Bank Indonesia 
could not have independence in 
monetary policies. The huge capital flow 
affected the monetary policies and hence 
caused problems for macroeconomic 
management. 
Historically, the depreciation of the 
rupiah was a familiar story. In terms of 
the US dollar, the rupiah was worth less 
than a millionth of its original 1949 value. 
In November 1949, the exchange rate 
was 3.80 old rupiah per dollar or 0.00380 
current rupiah per dollar (see Table 5). 
Bank Indonesia replaced the old rupiah 
with the current rupiah in December 
1965 at one current rupiah equal to a 
thousand old rupiah. The replacement’s 
purpose was to finance the large deficit 
in the government budget and to pay 
foreign debts. In 1970, the value of the 
current rupiah was dropped to 378 per 
dollar. Printing money to finance 
government budgets was the main 
reason for depreciation of the rupiah until 
the late 1980s. After that time, the 
depreciation continued but only at a low 
rate until 1997. When Bank Indonesia 
floated the rupiah at the end of 1997, its 
value felt dramatically to more than 
12,000 per dollar. To prevent the rupiah 
falling further, Bank Indonesia intervened 
                                                          
14 Fischer and Reisen (1993) argue that the East 
Asian countries, including Indonesia, achieved the 
impossible trinity challenges. This argument 
seems not to have worked for Indonesia during the 
economic crisis. 
in the money market, and tried to 
maintain the value of the rupiah at not 
more than 10,000 per dollar.15 
Schuler (1998) argued that the 
problem of persistent depreciation in 
rupiah reflects lack of credibility of the 
central bank. To solve this, he suggested 
a fundamental reform by making 
changes to the central bank. He argued 
that Bank Indonesia should be replaced 
by a currency board. A CBA a la 
Hongkong might be helpful to undo the 
damage that the depreciation of the 
rupiah had created. This suggestion was 
considered by Presiden Suharto in early 
1998. Therefore, he instructed a small 
group of officials from Bank Indonesia 
and the Ministry of Finance to draft a 
new bill for a CBA’s implementation. The 
action then attracted a huge debate 
about the advantages and disadvantages 
of adopting a CBA for Indonesia. 
2. Arguments For and Against 
Adoption of CBA in Indonesia 
A CBA failed to be established in 
Indonesia after the government and the 
directors of Bank Indonesia decided that 
the costs of adopting a CBA would 
outweigh the benefits. The following for 
and against arguments capture the 
benefits and the costs (respectively) of a 
currency board for Indonesia during the 
economic crisis. 
                                                          
15 Although Bank Indonesia said the rupiah was 
free to float after August 1997, Bank Indonesia 
keeps intervening in the money market through 
open market operations. 
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a. Arguments for (or the benefits of) a 
currency board in Indonesia 
1) Stable currency 
After Indonesia floated the 
rupiah against the US$ in August 
1997, the rupiah began a 
depreciation. The rupiah fell from 
2431 per dollar on 1 July 1997 to 
about 17,000 per dollar in January 
1998 (see Table 5 above). During 
that period, the rupiah became a 
second-class currency within 
Indonesia. Some merchants, 
especially those who sold imported 
content products, quoted prices in 
US$. People preferred to hold US$ 
instead of rupiah. The sharp increase 
in prices of goods caused panic 
buying of rice, vegetable oil, and 
other staples. In the business sector, 
many Indonesian companies could 
not pay dollar-denominated debts. As 
a result, real sectors could not work 
well. This indicated a chain of 
bankruptcies. Bankrupt businesses 
could not repay their bank loans, so 
the banking system could collapse. 
 The proponent for currency 
boards argued that the depreciation 
of the rupiah could be stopped by 
adopting a currency board. A 
currency board would undo much of 
the damage that the depreciation of 
the rupiah had created. By fixing the 
rupiah at a certain rate against the 
US$ there would be no incentive for 
speculators to attack the rupiah. The 
rupiah would be a stable currency 
and the loss of confidence about the 
rupiah would then be eliminated. 
With fixed rupiah at a certain rate 
against the US$, inflation in 
Indonesia would be lower and the 
economy would start to growth 
Table 5. Rupiah per US dollar, 1949-2002 
 
Year Rupiah per US dollar 
Nopember 1949 3.08 old rupiah = 0.00380 current 
rupiah 
1960 90 old rupiah = 0.0900 current 
rupiah 
1970 378 current rupiah 
1980 626.75 
1990 1901 
1 July 1997 2431 
January 1998 More than 12,000; low of 17,000 
December 2002 8940 
Note: the current rupiah replaced the old rupiah in December 1965 
at 1 current rupiah = 1000 old rupiah. 
Source: Bank Indonesia, Schuler (1998). 
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again. Even though a currency board 
would not solve all Indonesia’s 
economic problems, it would make 
many of them less severe (Schuler, 
1998). 
The experiences of Hong Kong 
which stabilized its currency during 
the speculative attack by reverting 
back to a more orthodox currency 
board can be a reference for 
Indonesia. By announcing that the 
exchange rate would be fixed at 
HK7.80 dollar per US dollar and by 
committing to maintain the exchange 
rate, the HKMA succeeded to end its 
currency crisis. The loss of 
confidence about Hong Kong’s 
economy was eliminated. A stable 
currency provided the basis for Hong 
Kong to continue its rapid economic 
growth. 
2) A better financial condition for 
commercial banks 
Many problems of Indonesian 
banks resulted from the currency 
crisis. The banks had lent to 
companies that also had foreign 
debt. The companies borrowed 
foreign debt at 2500 rupiah per 
dollar but had to pay back at 12,000 
rupiah per dollar during the currency 
crisis. This caused companies to go 
bankrupt and the loans that 
commercial banks had made to them 
could not be repaid. As a result, the 
banking system was also in trouble. 
The very high interest rate that 
resulted from the effort to stop 
capital outflow from Indonesia was 
another reason the banking system 
in Indonesia was in trouble. Saving 
interest rates were much higher than 
credit interest rates. This caused 
huge losses in commercial banks. 
Many banks then lost liquidity. 
The effort of the IMF to help the 
banking system made the problem 
even worse. By proposing that it 
would give deposit insurance only to 
government-owned banks, the IMF 
created panic among Indonesian 
depositors. Suddenly, the depositors 
started withdrawing money from 
some private-owned banks, causing 
liquidation of several private banks. 
To maintain the confidence from 
depositors to the banking system, 
Bank Indonesia then promised to 
back up all deposits in all commercial 
banks. This action made the problem 
even more complicated. Commercial 
banks became dependent on lending 
from Bank Indonesia. 
According to Schuler (1998) and 
Culp, Hanke, and Miller (1999), by 
adopting a currency board that fixed 
the rupiah at 4,000 or 5,000 per 
dollar, companies that were almost 
bankrupt might be able to repay the 
foreign debt and start to operate 
again. They argued that as long as 
the government strongly committed 
to maintain the exchange rate at the 
fixed value, the rupiah would regain 
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its confidence and the domestic 
purchasing power would then be 
close to the fixed rate. There would 
be no need of high interest rates to 
prevent capital outflow. With lower 
interest rates and the ability of 
companies to pay back their loans to 
commercial banks, the banks would 
then be in a better financial 
condition. 
3) Eliminate dependency of commercial 
banks on Bank Indonesia 
Theoretically, a central bank is a 
lender of last resort. It lends only to 
commercial banks (or sometimes to 
other financial firms) and only in 
emergencies. Unfortunately, the 
central bank of Indonesia (Bank 
Indonesia) is not so self-disciplined. 
It becomes entangled with financing 
the government, state-owned 
enterprises, and commercial banks in 
situation that are not emergencies. 
Rather than being a lender of last 
resort, Bank Indonesia becomes a 
lender of first resort, creating a 
dangerous dependency on it among 
those it lends to. Every time 
commercial banks have a problem 
with liquidity, they borrow from Bank 
Indonesia. This fact shows that Bank 
Indonesia is incompetent in its 
function as the lender of last resort. 
By adopting a CBA, there would 
no longer discrepancy in monetary 
policies. A central bank would be 
replaced by a currency board, which 
would only function as a warehouse 
of foreign reserve to back up 
currency in circulation. There would 
be no lender of first resort anymore. 
Commercial banks would have to find 
other sources of cash, especially 
from customers. In this case, the 
commercial banks would become 
more efficient because they compete 
freely in order to attract customers. 
4) Lower inflation and higher growth 
Experiences from countries 
adopting a CBA show that they have 
lower inflation and higher economic 
growth after adopting the CBA. 
Schuler (1998) argued that this 
performance could be a good 
reference for Indonesia to establish a 
currency board. With a currency 
board, the exchange rate of 
Indonesia would be stable and 
inflation would be lower. These 
would then provide a condition for 
the economy to grow again.  
b. Arguments against (or the costs of) a 
currency board in Indonesia. 
1) Fully backed foreign reserves 
A fully backed currency board 
would be very costly for Indonesia to 
maintain. Since Indonesia has 
already committed to guarantee 
deposits in its banking system, a 
currency board would have to cover 
a much broader measure of money 
than only the monetary base. It 
might even be necessary to use the 
broad M2 money supply, which 
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would cost US$66 billion at an 
exchange rate of Rp 5,000. 
At the time president Suharto 
considered a currency board, 
Indonesia had only US$8 billion 
foreign reserves, which was not even 
enough to back up the monetary 
base. In fact, Indonesia needed 
bailout loans from the IMF to finance 
its recovery programs. So, it was 
impossible to launch a fully backed 
currency board. The advocates of 
currency boards then came to the 
idea that the Indonesian currency 
board could be launched with partial 
backing. 
 The problem is if a currency 
board is launched with only partial 
backing, the board would not have 
enough resources to fight off a 
speculative attack, and such an 
attack could bring the currency board 
down. The loss of confidence in the 
rupiah would continue. Hence, the 
currency board would not solve the 
exchange rate problem. 
2) The “correct” value of the exchange 
rate. 
Another cost in creating a 
currency board in Indonesia at that 
time was the degree of uncertainty 
over the “correct” value of the 
rupiah. Advocates of currency boards 
suggested that the exchange rate be 
fixed at 4,000 or 5,000 per US dollar, 
or about twice of its market value of 
12,000 rupiah per dollar. If the fixed 
value were “correct”, there would be 
no incentive for speculators to attack 
the board. In contrast, if the fixed 
value were overvalued, the 
speculators would expect the rupiah 
to depreciate again. Further capital 
outflow would bring down the 
partially backed currency board. 
3) Further panic and huge liquidation of 
commercial banks 
At the time President Suharto 
considered adopting a currency 
board, the banking system was in 
trouble. There was loss of confidence 
about the banking system in 
Indonesia. Many commercial banks 
almost went bankrupt because of 
negative spreads in interest rates 
and bad debts. Bank Indonesia 
guaranteed to back up all deposits in 
all commercial banks in order to 
avoid huge liquidation of commercial 
banks. Adopting a currency board at 
that time would create further panic 
because there would be no more 
guarantee for deposits (since under 
CBAs, a central bank can not engage 
in discretionary monetary policies). 
People would madly withdraw their 
deposits in commercial banks. 
Analysts (for example Montagnon, 
1998) predicted that about 200 of 
220 Indonesian commercial banks 
would be closed if Indonesia adopted 
a currency board. 
4) IMF would stop the bailout money 
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The IMF opposed a currency 
board in Indonesia during the crisis. 
According to the head of the IMF, 
Michel Camdessus, the time had not 
yet come for Indonesia to adopt a 
CBA. Some necessary conditions 
should be satisfied before Indonesia 
adopted this arrangement. Among 
those was the need for Indonesia to 
obtain substantial reserves of dollars 
and strengthen the country’s banking 
system. Without the capability to 
sustain a fixed exchange rate, 
adopting a CBA would not result in 
exchange rate stability. On the 
contrary, it would result in further 
loss of confidence in the rupiah. 
The strong disagreement from 
the IMF about Indonesia’s currency 
board could be seen clearly when 
Camdessus wrote a private letter to 
President Suharto threatening to cut 
off bailout money if Indonesia 
established a currency board. The 
IMF wanted Indonesia to stick to the 
economic programs that had been 
agreed. Camdessus wrote that if 
Jakarta implemented the move 
anytime soon, he would urge the 
board of the IMF to suspend the 
US$43 billion bailout money. 
5) Economic crisis, not merely currency 
crisis 
The crisis in Indonesia was not 
merely a currency crisis. It was 
already at the stage of economic and 
political crises. Adopting a currency 
board would not have solved the 
economic crisis. A currency board 
with partially back up would cost 
further speculative attacks and 
further panic in the banking system 
as mentioned in points 1) and 3) 
above. 
The benefits above could be obtained 
if the currency board was fully backed 
and the monetary authority committed to 
maintain a sustainable fixed rate. A 
partial backing currency board has little 
difference with a standard pegged 
exchange rate. With a partial backing 
currency board, Indonesia would not be 
able to maintain the fixed rate. 
Therefore, there was no need to 
establish a currency board in Indonesia. 
 
E. Conclusion 
Currency board arrangements 
regained their popularity when several 
countries decided adopting these 
arrangements in 1990s. The Southeast 
Asian countries, especially Indonesia, 
also considered these arrangements 
during the financial crisis. The 
consideration attracted a huge debate 
about the advantages and the 
disadvantages of adopting a currency 
board. 
From the experiences of countries 
that had already established a currency 
board, the economic performance of 
these countries has been more stable 
than countries under other pegged 
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exchange rate, or even than countries 
under floating exchange rates. The 
countries under CBAs have lower 
inflation, higher economic growth, and 
lower fiscal deficits compare to other 
pegged exchange rate regimes and 
floating exchange rate regimes. From the 
experiences of Hong Kong and Argentina, 
it can be see that countries would 
achieve stable economic performance if 
they consistently maintained currency 
boards. One they started to be 
inconsistent, the markets would respond, 
and result in deterioration in the 
exchange rate and economic 
performances. 
In the case of Indonesia, adopting a 
currency board during crisis would result 
in larger costs than benefits. The benefits 
would be obtained if Indonesia adopted a 
fully backed currency board. However, 
the necessary conditions to operate a 
fully backed currency board were not 
satisfied during the crisis. Indonesia did 
not have enough reserves to back up its 
monetary base and the banking systems 
was not yet ready to receive the fact of 
no lender of last resort. 
The benefits of currency board for 
Indonesia were: a stable currency, a 
better financial condition for commercial 
banks, elimination of dependency from 
the commercial banks on Bank 
Indonesia, and lower inflation and a 
higher growth. The costs were: the 
difficulty to maintain a fully backed 
currency board, the degree of 
uncertainty of the “correct” value for the 
exchange rate, further panic and the 
huge liquidation of commercial banks, 
and postponement of bailout money from 
the IMF.   
The fully backed currency board was 
impossible to establish because 
Indonesia did not have enough reserves 
to back up the monetary base. The idea 
to launch a partially backed currency 
board would cause Indonesia to not be 
able to obtain the benefits of a currency 
board. Beside that, a partially backed 
currency board would not be successful 
to counter speculative attacks. 
The decision not to establish a 
currency board after long consideration 
was the best decision for the Indonesia 
government at that time. The dispute 
about the monetary regime, whether to 
adopt a currency board or not, had 
already caused bad impacts on the 
Indonesian economy. The IMF even 
thought that the dispute would drag 
other countries in the Southeast Asian 
region to deeper economic crisis. 
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